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1. Introduction 
 
Financial analysts are viewed as important information intermediaries within capital markets 
(Beaver 1998). Regulators and other market participants view analysts’ activities as 
increasing the information efficiency of security prices because of their expertise and 
knowledge in firm valuation (Frankel, Kothari & Weber 2006). In particular, it is important 
to highlight that financial reports are rarely seen as providing a full picture to value a 
company, not only from the fact that financial reports do not capture all of the growth 
potential of a firm, but also that accounting standards can sometimes limit the usefulness of 
some information. One example that is often highlighted is that most investment in 
intangibles is considered an expense rather than an asset in the balance sheet. This accounting 
treatment of expensing most investment in intangibles tends to undervalue the assets reported 
on the balance sheet. These limitations in financial reports reduce the ability of investors to 
assess the earnings potential of intangible-rich firms. Therefore there is a tendency for 
financial analysts to track and follow more intangible-rich firms, as it is these firms that tend 
to be harder to value. 
In this paper we investigate directly whether forecast accuracy has changed after 
Australia's adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This is 
important because there has been some debate about the implication of the adoption of IFRS 
in Australia (see, for example, Jones, Rahman & Wolnizer 2004). Some research has argued 
that the adoption of IFRS takes Australia to a more restrictive regime and reduces the quality 
of financial reporting (see Matolcsy & Wyatt 2006; Ritter & Wells 2006). 
On the other hand, the Commonwealth Government1 and the Financial Reporting 
Council2 (FRC) expect significant benefits from the adoption of IFRS; such as improved 
access to international capital markets, more transparent and understandable standards, 
improved communication with investors, and higher quality financial reports (see FRC 2002; 
CLERP 9 2002; Jones & Higgins 2006). We contribute to this debate by examining whether 
analysts' forecast accuracy has changed from the pre-AIFRS period (2002-2004) to the post-
AIFRS period (2005-2007). The results of our research (after controlling for relevant factors) 
show increased forecast accuracy in the post-AIFRS period. The increase in forecast accuracy 
of financial analysts – who are considered as important information intermediaries in the 
financial market – provides some evidence of the possible positive effect of AIFRS on the 
users of financial reports in Australia. 
As a secondary objective, we investigate directly whether financial analysts can reduce 
information asymmetry in the Australian capital market by improving forecast accuracy. We 
do this by investigating whether more analysts following a firm improve forecast accuracy by 
producing more firm-specific information to the market The next section of this paper 
provides a brief literature review examining the potential impact of AIFRS, and develops the 
paper’s hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data used and Section 4 covers the research 
                                                            
 
1 Australia’s move to IFRS was initiated by the Commonwealth Government as part of its Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (CLERP). CLERP No. 9 ‘Corporate Disclosure: Strengthening the Financial 
Reporting Framework’ (released in September 2002) recommended that IFRS be adopted by the Australian 
Accounting Standard Board (AASB) by January 2005. CLERP 9 was the ninth in a series of corporate 
legislative reforms introduced by the federal government (Brown & Tarca 2005). 
 
2 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) has the prime responsibility for accounting regulation in Australia. 
FRC members are appointed by the treasurer. Although the FRC is responsible for overall policy direction in 
accounting regulation, the development of accounting standards is the responsibility of the Australian 
Accounting Standards Board (Haswell & McKinnon 2003). 
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design employed for the empirical analysis, which are described in Section 5. The final 
section presents the summary and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
This paper evaluates the impact of financial reports of Australian companies abiding by 
AIFRS since 2005. This takes Australia from its own accounting standard-setting regime to a 
new regime. The adoption of AIFRS has proven highly controversial in Australia, and it has 
led to the emergence of a lively debate on the benefits and costs of AIFRS. The major 
concerns relate to the widespread perception that AIFRS are of a lower quality than the local 
Australian accounting standards (Walker & Jones 2003). Many of the claimed benefits of 
adopting AIFRS proposed by the Government in its CLERP initiatives (such as the provision 
of higher quality accounting standards), are questioned in various research papers (see 
Haswell & McKinnon 2003; Lonergan 2003). 
The adoption of AIFRS has changed the recognition and measurement practices for 
investment in some intangible assets. Under the previous Australian GAAP (AGAAP), 
internally generated goodwill was not recognised and purchased goodwill was capitalised. 
Moreover, the purchased goodwill was amortised over a maximum period of 20 years. Under 
the AIFRS, goodwill is subject to an impairment test. Under the AGAAP both internally 
generated and purchased identifiable intangible assets could be recognised. AIFRS classifies 
the expenditure on internally generated intangibles into research phases and development 
phases (AASB 138). Expenditure on research must be expensed in the current period. 
Expenditure incurred in the development phase may be capitalised if it satisfies conditions 
related to the completion, technical feasibility and saleability of the asset (AASB 138). Some 
internally generated identifiable intangibles that could previously be recognised as assets 
under the AGAAP (e.g. mastheads, publishing rights, brands and customer lists) are not 
allowable as assets under AIFRS. Intangible assets must be tested for impairment and written 
down if their value is impaired under the AIFRS. Capitalised identifiable intangibles can now 
be revalued only if the fair value is determined by reference to an active market. 
Ritter and Wells (2006) raise the concern that the restrictive rules of AIFRS will 
remove some identifiable internally generated intangible assets from the balance sheet. This 
means that management is prevented from recognising internally generated intangible assets 
such as brand, mastheads and customer loyalty. Investment by companies in such intangibles 
is likely to be an important factor in driving future performance (Webster 1999). Prior 
evidence suggests that discretionary disclosure of internally generated capitalised intangible 
assets is useful to investors (Lev 2001; Wyatt 2005). Thus, in the post-AIFRS period, the 
financial reports are likely to provide less information about investment in intangibles, and 
this may potentially reduce analysts’ ability to make accurate earnings forecasts. 
Australia had its own accounting standard-setting arrangements before adopting the 
AIFRS. Australian accounting standards were largely high-quality accounting standards and 
even considered to be similar to IFRS (Ashbaugh & Pincus 2001). In 1996, Australia also 
took the initiative to harmonise its own accounting standards with the IFRS. So the adoption 
of the AIFRS in 2005 may not have brought a substantial change in accounting practices in 
Australia. This calls into question the concern raised by some of the potentially reduced 
usefulness of financial statements in the post-AIFRS period. However, whether the AIFRS 
adoption improves or damages financial reporting in Australia is open to empirical 
investigation. This paper provides evidence on the debate by focusing on analysts’ forecast 
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H1: Earnings forecast accuracy has not changed in the post-AIFRS period from the 
 pre-AIFRS period. 
 
This study will therefore contribute to the growing literature that provides empirical 
evidence on the impact of the AIFRS in Australia. Using AIFRS and AGAAP measures of 
goodwill and identifiable intangible assets available in the financial reports of 20053, 
Chalmers, Clinch and Godfrey (2008) find evidence that AIFRS conveys incremental useful 
information (beyond that available in AGAAP) in relation to goodwill only. For total 
intangible assets, they do not find any evidence that the AIFRS provides information beyond 
that in AGAAP. In fact, they find evidence that AGAAP provides incremental information in 
relation to identifiable intangibles. Gallery, Cooper and Sweeting (2008) provide evidence 
that the quality of disclosures about the likely effects of AIFRS can be explained by audit 
quality, company-specific and industry-specific factors4. On the basis of information 
available in the 2004/05 and 2005/06 annual reports, Cheung, Evans and Wright (2008) 
compare the projected and realised impact of the introduction of AASB 138 in terms of 
reported intangible assets and key financial measures. They find that the reported AIFRS 
results are different to the forecast results for intangible assets and only the debt to equity 
ratio is significantly different under the AGAAP and AIFRS. 
The second issue that this paper addresses is the role of financial analysts in reducing 
information asymmetry. Financial reports provide information about the earnings potential of 
a firm by disclosing its earnings, assets and liabilities. However, information available in 
financial reports is constrained by accounting standards. Accounting standards require the 
satisfaction of recognition rules to disclose items on financial statements. Accounting mostly 
recognises expenditure on intangibles (such as research and development, and advertising) as 
expenses. Most of the investments in internally generated intangibles (such as brand, 
customer loyalty and goodwill) are not shown on the balance sheet as assets even though 
firms invest in such intangibles to increase their future income. In order to recognise 
expenditure as an asset, it needs to be probable that future economic benefits will flow into 
the business. This probability test requires a high degree of certainty regarding the future 
economic benefits that will flow from the expenditure. 
Unfortunately, it is sometimes hard to determine the amount and timing of economic 
benefits that will eventuate from investments in intangibles with any degree of certainty. 
Investments in intangibles (such as advertising expenditure), are often expensed in the current 
year, as it is hard to know when the pecuniary benefits will flow. There would effectively be 
a difficulty in matching the expenditure on intangibles to the resulting future income. As a 
result, this leads to most investments in intangibles being recognised as an expense in the 
year they occur. On the other hand, investments in tangible items (such as buildings and 
machinery) do not face the same difficulties since the amount and timing of economic 
benefits from such investments are far more easily measurable with greater certainty. 
                                                            
3  AASB 1 First-time adoption of Australian Equivalents to International Financial Reporting Standards 
requires an entity to explain how the transition from AGAAP to AIFRS affects its financial statements. 
4 AASB 147 Disclosing Impacts of Adopting AIFRS required a two-step approach to the disclosure of the 
expected effects of AIFRS adoption. Reporting entities were required to provide a narrative explanation of the 
expected differences in accounting policies in their 2004 financial reports. In annual or interim financial reports 
ending on or after 30 June 2005, reporting entities were required to provide reliable information about the 
impacts on the financial report had it been prepared using the AIFRS (Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 2008). 
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The accounting treatment of expensing most of the investments in intangibles makes 
the accounting earnings (profit) less representative of the real earnings of a firm. In particular, 
the profit of a firm will be understated in years in which large investments are made in 
intangibles. The profit of the firm will be overstated in subsequent years as economic benefits 
(i.e. income) will result from prior years’ investment in intangibles but no expense will be 
charged against such income. Thus the accounting treatment of investments in intangibles 
makes the reported earnings volatile. This is referred to as the ‘noise effect’. As a result, 
analysts may find it hard to predict earnings based on the recorded past earnings of firms who 
have a higher investment in intangibles. Previous empirical studies have already 
demonstrated a positive relationship between financial analysts’ earnings forecast errors and 
the disclosure of ‘noisier’ information (Lobo, Kwon & Ndubizu 1998). Imhoff and Lobo 
(1992) conjecture that forecast dispersion in preannouncement analysts’ earnings forecasts is 
a proxy for noise in the firm’s earnings number. 
The difficulty of predicting the earnings of intangible-rich companies is likely to 
increase the demand for analysts’ earnings forecasts since analysts are seen to have a superior 
ability to assess the earnings potential of firms (Kwon 2002). Barth, Kasznik and McNichols 
(2001) show that more analysts follow intangible-rich companies in the United States (US) as 
there is an increased demand for earnings forecasts for these companies. Also, due to their 
potential high growth opportunity, intangible-rich firms are likely to attract more attention 
from investors, financial analysts, and the general investment community compared to other 
firms (Kwon 2002). If companies with a higher investment in intangibles undergo closer 
scrutiny by a larger number of financial analysts as objects of recommendation, this will 
increase the potential for more accurate information available for such companies (Kwon 
2002). The availability of more accurate information, may in turn lead to a higher level of 
financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for intangible-rich firms. This is commonly 
referred to as the ‘information effect’, as documented by Greenstein and Sami (1994) when 
referring to more analysts following firms in the US. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that a higher investment in intangibles brings 
two competing effects; namely, the noise effect and the information effect. Although there is 
more demand for analysts to follow firms with high intangibles that could imply more 
accurate earnings forecasts, the reported earnings of such firms are also likely to be more 
unpredictable. In other words, this could lead the noise effect to dominate over the 
information effect as high intangible firms have more unrecognised assets and this makes it 
harder for analysts to accurately forecast earnings. 
Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), Lys and Sohn (1990) and Francis and Soffer (1997) 
show that – on average – analysts’ reports communicate important information to markets for 
valuation and trading purposes. Kim and Schroeder (1990) attribute security analysts’ 
forecasting accuracy to their ability to incorporate relevant information other than that 
included in the historical earnings of a firm. When a firm goes through close scrutiny by 
more analysts, there is more information available about the firm. In particular, Kwon (2002) 
states that with the improvement in information technology and internet facilities, new 
information quickly flows through to the investment community. This availability of more 
information as a result of an increased analysts’ following reduces earnings forecast error. 
Brown, Taylor and Walter (1999) provided evidence in Australia between 1992 and 
1996 that analyst forecast error is negatively related to the number of analysts following a 
firm. Therefore, we test to see if this relationship still holds, and following from Brown, 
Taylor and Walter (1999) we hypothesise that the forecast error is negatively related to the 




AAFBJ  |  Volume 4, no. 3, 2010 
H2: Earnings forecast error is negatively related to the number of analysts following a 
 firm. 
 
3. Sample and Data 
 
The study focuses on the top 100 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 
terms of market capitalisation between 2002 and 2007. All analysts’ forecast earnings per 
share for each company from the start of 2002 until the end of 2007 are extracted from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. To avoid any potential survivorship 
bias, companies which have been part of the ASX100 constituent list between 2002 and 2007 
are incorporated in our research. There are 142 companies incorporated into the ASX100 
constituent list between 2002 and 2007. At any given point in time, the ASX100 constituent 
list contains only 100 companies5. 77 companies are excluded from the study due to 
insufficient analyst forecast data before and/or after the introduction of AIFRS in Australia. 
This leaves us with 65 companies over a 6-year time period. We ignored year 2008 in our 
studies to avoid any potential confounding effects from the Global Financial Crisis which 
started at the beginning of July 2007. Also, given that some companies are not listed at the 
beginning of the sample period and some companies delisted during the study period, we had 
an unbalanced dataset. Our research covers 35 institutional brokers and 657 analysts who 
provide earnings estimates over the sample periods. In particular, we focussed on the “Detail 
History” document (Analyst Earnings Estimate History) provided by the I/B/E/S database. To 
maintain consistency, the actual earnings per share data for each company were also extracted 
from the I/B/E/S database. The initial sample contained 20,823 individual analyst forecast 
observations (EPS). Information about accounting variables such as total assets, total debt, 
intangible assets, research and development expenses, and total expenses were obtained from 
Thomson Financial databases. In addition, the Total Return Index (used to determine the 
stock price volatility) was downloaded from the Datastream Database6. 
The one-year forward earnings forecasts – made within 30 days after the release of 
annual financial statements – are used in this study. This means, for example, that if a 
company releases its annual financial statement for the fiscal year ending June 30th 2002 on 
the 1st August 2002, that we collected individual analyst forecast data available between 1st 
August and 30th August 2002. This ensures that analysts impound in their forecast the 
information from the financial report of the year prior to the forecast year. In the event that 
the same analyst provided more than one forecast during the 30 days period, only the first 
forecast was incorporated in our study. This ensured that our results were not driven by those 
analysts who consistently update their forecast earnings. The reason of having a cut-off point 
of 30 days after the release of annual financial statement is that we wanted to make sure 
analysts get the time to read and reflect on the information of the financial reports in their 
forecasts. The larger the time gap between the reporting date and the analyst forecasting date, 
the greater the effects of other information sources (in addition to information available in the 
annual financial reports) integrated with the forecast data. For example, analysts making 
forecasts in December 2002 may consider other information surrounding the first 6 months of 
the fiscal year (July to December 2002). 
 
4. Research Design 
 
We used a panel regression model across the 65 companies over the 2002-2007 time period. 
Specifically, a cross-section firm fixed effects estimation is used in the panel data analysis in 
                                                            
5 Technically speaking, the constituent list can be updated on a monthly basis. 
6 The stock price volatility is calculated based on the weekly changes in Total Return Index. 
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order to take into account the impact of unobserved factors on the dependent variable across 
different companies. In particular, the forecast error for a company may not only be 
connected to financial variables like total assets or intangible assets, but may also correlate 
with industry effects and individual company characteristics, such as management expertise 
and historical reputation, which are not captured by any financial variables. Thus, including a 
different intercept for every cross-section in the panel data analysis eliminated possible 
omitted variable bias from the panel regression results. To minimise potential autocorrelation 
problems, we used White’s correction to cross-section standard errors to allow for general 
contemporaneous correlations between the company residuals in the panel model. Also, we 
utilised the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method to correct for the cross-section 
heteroscedasticity issue. 
Following Ali, Klein and Rosenfield (1992) the unsigned forecast error, FEit, for 
company i at time t is constructed as follows: 
 
FEit = | ( Mean forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit |                    (1) 
To test H1 and H2, we estimate the following panel regression model: 
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit + 
β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit                    (2) 
 t=2002, 2003, … , 2007; i=company 1, 2, ... , 65 
Where: 
ui = fixed effect for company i 
IFRSit = 1 if company i adopted the IFRS at time t and 0 otherwise 
NOAit = number of analysts who generate forecasts of earnings (analysts’ 
following) for company i at time t 
TAit = natural logarithm of total assets for company i at time t 
TDTAit = total debt divided by total assets (leverage ratio) for company i at 
  time t 
MVBVit = market value of equity divided by book value of equity for  
  company i at time t 
INTTAit = intangible assets recorded on the balance sheet divided by total 
assets for company i at time t 
RDTEXPit = research & development expenditure divided by total expenses 
for company i at time t 
STDEVit = standard deviation of weekly stock returns for company i at 
   time t 
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ROEit = return on equity for company i at time t 
eit = residual for company i at time t 
The coefficient β1 for the variable IFRS measures the relationship of forecast errors 
between pre-AIFRS and post-AIFRS periods as stated in Hypothesis 1. A statistically 
significant positive (negative) sign for β1 indicates that the forecast error has increased 
(decreased) in the post-AIFRS period. The coefficient β2 for the variable NOA measures the 
relationship between forecast error and number of analysts following a firm as stated in 
Hypothesis 2. A statistically significant positive sign for β2 indicates that the forecast error is 
higher for firms which are followed by more analysts (the domination of the noise effect over 
the information effect). A statistically significant negative sign for β2 indicates the domination 
of the information effect over the noise effect. 
Consistent with previous literature, 7 control variables are also incorporated in the 
panel data analysis. The 7 control variables are: size, leverage, growth opportunity, 
capitalised intangible assets, research and development expenditure (R&D), business risk and 




Lang and Lundholm (1996) argue that trading in securities is less costly for large firms with a 
large market value of equity. This increases the incentive for analysts to follow these firms. 
Barron et al. (2002) show a positive association between firm size and the quantity of 
information available to analysts. Thus, we control for firm size in our analyses using the 
natural logarithm of total assets (TA). We expect a negative relationship between firm size 




Total debt divided by total assets (TDTA) reflects the financial risk of a firm. As a firm’s 
debt increases, the task of accurately evaluating its debt-paying ability becomes more 
complex. To forecast company earnings, financial analysts would have to consider the 
inflation rate, interest rate, current and future operating cash flows and other relevant 
variables (Kwon 2002). These complexities would lead to a greater deviation among 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. We expect a positive relationship between leverage as measured 




Analysts invest resources to know more about high-growth firms, as there is a higher demand 
for private information about such firms (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990). The 
market value of equity divided by book value of equity (MVBV) is used as a proxy for 
growth opportunities. High growth firms may provide additional information using various 
methods (such as press releases, company websites and an annual general meeting) to inform 
potential investors about their growth potential. This higher level of information may help 
analysts to make better earnings forecasts. A negative coefficient for the growth proxy will 
provide evidence of the information effect brought by a greater level of voluntary disclosure 
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Intangible Assets and Research and Development Expenditure 
 
The accounting standard requires the satisfaction of certain conditions in order to capitalise 
investments in intangibles. These recognition conditions often take most of the investment in 
intangibles out of the balance sheet. However, some investments in intangibles (such as 
purchased goodwill, patents, copyrights and trademarks) are recorded on the balance sheet. 
These investments in intangibles are important for analysts as they reflect the future earnings 
potential of firms. Consistent with previous research, intangible assets divided by total assets 
(INTTA)7 and research & development expenditure divided by total expenses (RDTEXP) 
were incorporated into the panel data analysis (see Barron et al. 2002). 
 
Business Risk and Profitability 
 
Consistent with previous research (see Brown, Taylor & Walter 1999) we control for 
business risk. One would expect that the higher the business risk of a company, the more 
difficult it is to forecast the company’s earnings. We take the standard deviation of weekly 
stock returns (STDEV) as a measure of uncertainty in the market about a particular stock. 
The forecast error is expected to be higher for stocks with higher uncertainty. Also, the 
standard deviation of the stock returns also indirectly reflects the market condition (macro-
economic factor) and company specific information (micro-economic factor) for a given 
financial year. This will ensure that the panel regression results are not driven or influenced 
by a time factor or market economic conditions. 
Previous studies have indicated that the profitability of a business will influence the 
level of disclosure of a company (Wallace & Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-Ansah 
1998; Owusu-Ansah & Yeoh 2005; Gallery, Cooper & Sweeting 2008). The higher the 
profitability of a business, the more information will be disclosed to the public to minimise 
the undervaluation of the company’s shares. One could expect that the level of disclosure 
would influence analysts’ forecast errors. Typically, the return on shareholders’ equity (ROE) 
is used as a proxy for company profitability. 
 




The descriptive statistics of the dependent variable forecast error (FE) and all independent 
variables are provided in Table 1 (see Appendices for all tables). The mean of FE is greater 
than the median indicating that the distribution of forecast errors is positively skewed. With 
the exception of intangible assets (INTTA) and research & development expenditure 
(RDTEXP), the mean and median of all other independent variables are not greatly different8. 
The high (mean and median) return on equity (ROE) is partly driven by the outstanding 
companies’ performances in the financial year ended 2006. We also analysed the correlation 
matrix (Table 2) of all independent variables to ensure that there was no serious 
multicollinearity problem in the sample. From this, the highest correlation obtained was 
between market to book value of equity (MVBV) and research and development expenditure 
                                                            
7 Our study utilises Thomson ONE Banker as the primary data source. Here, the database classifies goodwill as 
part of intangible assets. 
 
8 The mean and median of unscaled total assets are significantly different. However the mean and median of 
natural logarithm of total assets (TA) are not significantly different. The natural logarithm of total assets is used 
in the panel regression model. 
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(RDTEXP) at 40%. The correlation is statistically significant at a level of 5%. Given that 
many growth firms tend to invest more heavily in research & development, it is not surprising 
to find a positive relationship between these two variables (MVBV & RDTEXP). Also, the 
size of the company (TA) seems to be moderately correlated with several other control 
variables. For example, large companies (high TA) tend to have lower growth opportunities 
(low MVBV) and invest less in R&D (low RDTEXP & INTTA). In addition, large 
companies usually have a lower business risk (low STDEV). Therefore we conclude that the 
size of the company (TA) has a negative relationship with the four other control variables 
(MVBV, RDTEXP, INTTA & STDEV). 
 
Panel Data Analysis 
 
The results of the panel data analysis are presented in Table 3 (see Appendices for all tables). 
To provide a robustness check for the results in our model, different permutations of the 
regression model are presented in Table 4 that utilise different combinations of the control 
variables. Technically, if the results for β1 and β2 are significant, then they should remain 
consistent even when we change the set of control variables in the model. To minimise the 
potential multicollinearity problem, we drop the total assets (TA) as a control variable in 
most of the equations. 
Also, given that some small companies may have a lower number of analysts following 
them, the mean of forecast EPS may not be the most appropriate measure of central tendency. 
The impact of one extreme forecast EPS can have a significant impact on the mean 
calculation for the dataset with a low number of observations. The median of forecast EPS 
may be more useful than the mean when there are extreme values in the dataset. To minimise 
potential problems related to mean calculation and to improve the robustness of the analysis, 
the median of forecast EPS is also used to calculate the forecast error. The panel data analysis 
results using the median forecast EPS are presented in Table 4. This secondary set of results 
will again provide a robustness check for any conclusions we make in regard to β1 and β2. 
As shown in both Table 3 and Table 4, the F-statistics are statistically significant across 
all 16 equations. In addition, the coefficient for AIFRS dummy β1 is negative and statistically 
significant for all equations. Indeed, the β1 is statistically significant at 99% confidence level 
(p-value < 0.01) for 13 of the 16 regressions across Tables 3 and 4. The negative coefficient 
β1 implies that analysts’ forecast error has decreased in the post-AIFRS period as compared 
to the pre-AIFRS period. The result provides some evidence that the adoption of AIFRS has 
improved the quality of the financial reports to the extent that analysts are able to make a 
better prediction about the future profitability of the companies. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Focusing mainly on Swiss, French and 
Canadian companies, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts increases after firms voluntarily adopted the IFRS. Putting the potential sample bias 
inherent in voluntary adoption aside, this study supports the view that the adoption of IFRS 
reduces the burden upon financial analysts to understand different accounting standards and 
lessens their need to make adjustments in order to improve forecast accuracy. This can be 
argued to have reduced the cost of processing financial information by analysts and is likely 
to induce greater stock market efficiency. 
On the other hand, analysts’ following is positively correlated with forecast error. The 
positive coefficient β2 is statistically significant across all 16 regressions. The positive 
relationship indicates that analysts’ forecast error increases as more analysts start to follow a 
firm. The result contrasts Brown, Taylor and Walter’s (1999) study. It indicates that 
information effect generated by a higher number of analysts does not offset the noise effect 
due to unrecognised intangibles. However, given that the coefficient of β2 is relatively small 
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(less than 0.01), one may argue that the economic significance of the analysts’ following is 
negligible. 
As for the control variables, two control variables are statistically significant across 
Table 3 and Table 4. The growth effect (MVBV) has the predicted negative relation with 
forecast error. Consistent with the literature (Bhushan 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan 1990), 
there is an incentive for growth firms to provide more private information to the market. This 
will in turn reduce the information asymmetry between investors and the firm. The higher 
level of information provided by the growth firms will help analysts to make better earnings 
forecasts. Also, consistent with our expectation, the higher the business risk of a company, 
the more difficult it is to forecast the companysearnings. There is a strong positive 




This paper has analysed two issues that can have an important bearing on the accuracy of 
earnings forecasts in the Australian capital market. The first is whether the adoption of 
AIFRS may have led to any change in the accuracy of earnings forecasts. The results from 
our analysis support the Financial Reporting Council’s expectation that the introduction of 
AIFRS would increase the reporting quality in Australia, inasmuch as it has improved 
analysts’ forecasts. The reduction in forecast error in the post-AIFRS period compared to the 
same in the pre-AIFRS period has important implications for financial reporting practices in 
Australia as it provides evidence of the increased usefulness of financial statements after the 
adoption of AIFRS. The statistically significant coefficient for the IFRS dummy variable for 
pre- and post-AIFRS periods reflects the increased forecast accuracy in the post-AIFRS 
period after controlling for the other relevant factors. Financial analysts act as important 
information intermediaries in the financial market. They are one of the important and 
informed users of financial reports. The relative improvement in the accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts does show a positive side to the adoption of the new accounting standards. 
The second item that this paper focussed on was whether there is a significant 
relationship between the number of analysts that follow a firm and the forecast error. We did 
not find support for Brown, Taylor and Walter’s (1999) earlier work of a negative 
relationship between forecast error and number of analysts following a firm. Rather, this 
paper provides evidence that the more analysts following a stock do not help to improve 
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  FE NOA TA TDTA MVBV INTTA RDTEXP STDEV ROE 
 Mean 0.1872 4.4777 8.6146 24.8043 3.8023 0.1699 0.0073 0.2373 22.0577 
 Median 0.1034 4.0000 8.3494 25.9241 2.6430 0.0762 0.0000 0.2179 20.9781 
 Maximum 2.3347 13.0000 13.2417 79.0069 47.5050 0.7777 0.2155 1.0408 483.1395 
 Minimum 0.0003 1.0000 4.9994 0.0000 0.4961 0.0000 0.0000 0.1074 -63.7398 
 Std. Dev. 0.2896 2.1491 1.7193 12.8889 4.2691 0.2192 0.0273 0.0931 38.7135 
 
This study uses the one-year forward earnings forecast (FE) that is made within 30 days after the release of annual financial statement. FE is the 
unsigned forecast error of company earnings. FE=|(Mean forecast EPS – Actual EPS)/Actual EPS|. 
 
NOA is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is 
equal to total debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets 
recorded on the balance sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. ROE represents net income (all operating and non-operating 
income and expense, income taxes and extraordinary items) after preference dividend divided by total common equity. Common equity 









  TA TDTA MVBV INTTA RDTEXP STDEV ROE 
TA 1.00       
TDTA ‐0.01 1.00      
MVBV ‐0.26*** 0.10* 1.00     
INTTA ‐0.29*** 0.30*** ‐0.03 1.00    
RDTEXP ‐0.28*** 0.02 0.40** 0.02 1.00   
STDEV ‐0.31*** ‐0.02 0.08 ‐0.08 0.21*** 1.00  
ROE ‐0.05 ‐0.05 0.17*** ‐0.04 0.03 ‐0.07 1.00 
 
***indicates the correlation is significant at the 1% level, **indicates the correlation is significant at the 5% level 
and *indicates the correlation is significant at the 10% level. 
 
NOA is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total 
assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity 
divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the balance sheet divided by total 
assets. RDTEXP is research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard 
deviation of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. ROE represents net income (all operating and non-
operating income and expense, income taxes and extraordinary items) after preference dividend divided by total 
common equity. Common equity represents common shareholders’ investment in a company. 
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Table 3 
Panel Data Regression Results using Mean Forecast Estimates 
FEit = | ( Mean forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit | 
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit + β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit 
  IFRS NOA TA TDTA MVBV INTTA RDTEXP STDEV ROE F-statistic adj R2   β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 
Equation 
1 
Coefficient -0.0118* 0.0044** -0.0246** 0.0010 -0.0031*** 0.0554 -1.3127 0.317*** 0.0002 3.4074*** 0.3162 
p-value 0.0838 0.0193 0.0221 0.2377 0.0029 0.3444 0.1427 0.0010 0.2899 0.0000 
Equation 
2 
Coefficient -0.0204*** 0.0050***  0.0008 -0.0022*** 0.0336 -1.2663 0.324*** 0.0002 3.4125*** 0.3137 
p-value 0.0020 0.0041  0.3557 0.0052 0.5256 0.1623 0.0008 0.3063 0.0000 
Equation 
3 
Coefficient -0.0232*** 0.0053***  0.0008  0.0475 -1.5679 0.3288*** 0.0001 3.4872*** 0.3173 
p-value 0.0011 0.0025  0.3813  0.3299 0.1004 0.0002 0.4288 0.0000 
Equation 
4 
Coefficient -0.0196*** 0.0046***  0.0009 -0.0026***  -1.3059 0.3182*** 0.0002 3.4414*** 0.3133 
p-value 0.0023 0.0069  0.3080 0.0028  0.1010 0.0004 0.2534 0.0000 
Equation 
5 
Coefficient -0.0199*** 0.0042***  0.0010 -0.0035***   0.3401*** 0.0002 3.4585*** 0.3117 
p-value 0.0019 0.0089  0.2375 0.0004   0.0000 0.1605 0.0000 
Equation 
6 
Coefficient -0.0213*** 0.0063*** -0.0145 0.0014** -0.0046***     3.4351*** 0.3060 
p-value 0.0000 0.0004 0.1160 0.0123 0.0013     0.0000 
Equation 
7 
Coefficient -0.018** 0.0055***      0.3784*** 0.0003* 3.4685*** 0.3058 
p-value 0.0101 0.0000      0.0000 0.0561 0.0000 
Equation 
8 
Coefficient -0.0215*** 0.0083***        3.2195*** 0.2772 
p-value 0.0006 0.0000        0.0000 
 
***Indicates rejection of the null at the 1% level, **indicates rejection of the null at the 5% level and *indicates rejection of the null at the 10% level 
 
The constant and fixed effect parameters are not presented in the table. White cross-section standard errors are used in the panel regressions to allow for 
general contemporaneous correlation between the company residuals. Cross-section weight is introduced in the regression (Generalised Least Squares 
method) to correct for the cross-section heteroscedasticity problem. IFRS is equal to 1 if the forecasts are in the post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. NOA 
is the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total 
debt divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the 
balance sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is the research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard deviation 
of weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. 
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Panel Data Regression Results using Median Forecast Estimates 
FEit = | ( Median forecast EPSit – Actual EPSit ) / Actual EPSit | 
FEit = α0 + ui + β1 IFRSit + β2 NOAit + β3 TAit + β4 TDTAit + β5 MVBVit + β6 INTTAit + β7 RDTEXPit + β8 STDEVit + β9 ROEit + eit 
  IFRS NOA TA TDTA MVBV INTTA RDTEXP STDEV ROE F-statistic adj R2   β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 β6 β7 β8 β9 
Equation 
1 
Coefficient -0.0273*** 0.0079*** -0.0061 0.0009 -0.0049*** -0.0055 -0.4596 0.2571*** 0.0002 3.296*** 0.3055 
p-value 0.0065 0.0001 0.5401 0.3151 0.0020 0.9202 0.6435 0.0000 0.1958 0.0000 
Equation 
2 
Coefficient -0.0311*** 0.0082***  0.0012 -0.0048*** -0.0351 -0.4185 0.2853*** 0.0002 3.4000*** 0.3120 
p-value 0.0053 0.0000   0.2422 0.0000 0.5041 0.6654 0.0000 0.3275 0.0000 
Equation 
3 
Coefficient -0.0355*** 0.0088***  0.001  -0.0053 -0.7374 0.2968*** 0.0001 3.4517*** 0.3136 
p-value 0.0027 0.0000   0.3029   0.9169 0.4858 0.0000 0.4868 0.0000 
Equation 
4 
Coefficient -0.031*** 0.0076***  0.0007 -0.0048***  -0.3925 0.2713*** 0.0002 3.3745*** 0.3068 
p-value 0.0020 0.0001   0.4329 0.0014   0.6781 0.0000 0.2505 0.0000 
Equation 
5 
Coefficient -0.0314*** 0.0075***  0.0008 -0.0050***   0.2789*** 0.0002 3.4241*** 0.3081 
p-value 0.0017 0.0001   0.4228 0.0012     0.0000 0.2271 0.0000 
Equation 
6 
Coefficient -0.0336*** 0.0099*** 0.0059 0.0006 -0.0048***     3.6651*** 0.3250 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.4703 0.4074 0.0022         0.0000 
Equation 
7 
Coefficient -0.0321*** 0.0088***      0.3061*** 0.0002 3.4343*** 0.3023 
p-value 0.0022 0.0000           0.0000 0.1304 0.0000 
Equation 
8 
Coefficient -0.0302** 0.0002***        3.5698*** 0.3069 
p-value 0.0117 0.0000               0.0000 
 
***Indicates rejection of the null at the 1% level, **indicates rejection of the null at the 5% level and *indicates rejection of the null at the 10% level. 
 
The constant and fixed effect parameters are not presented in the table. White cross-section standard errors are used in the panel regressions to allow for 
general contemporaneous correlation between the company residuals. Cross-section weight is introduced in the regression (Generalised Least Squares 
method) to correct the cross-section heteroscedasticity problem. IFRS is equal to 1 if the forecasts are in the post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. NOA is 
the number of analysts who generate forecasts of company earnings. TA is the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions). TDTA is equal to total debt 
divided by total assets. MVBV is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. INTTA is the intangible assets recorded on the balance 
sheet divided by total assets. RDTEXP is the research and development expenditure divided by total expenses. STDEV is the standard deviation of 
weekly stock returns. ROE is the return on equity. 
